- Michel de Montaigne (maior dos meus heróis, epistemocrata)
- Francis Bacon (cético e empírico)
- Karl Popper
- Benoit B. Mandelbrot
- David Hume
- Bertrand Russell
- Daniel Kahneman
- Amos Tversky
- Il Deserto dei Tartari - Dino Buzzati
- Frédéric Bastiat - O que você vê e o que você não vê
- Jacques Hadamard
- Henri Poincaré
- Lorenz - teoria do caos e complexidade
- Friedrich von Hayek - a pretensão do conhecimento
- Jean-Philippe Bouchaud
- Robert Ludlow Trivers
- Philip Tetlock - Superprevisões
- Isaiah Berlin - The hedgehog and the fox
- Sextus Empiricus
“Black Swan logic makes what you don’t know far more relevant than what you do know.”
“So I disagree with the followers of Marx and those of Adam Smith: the reason free markets work is because they allow people to be lucky, thanks to aggressive trial and error, not by giving rewards or “incentives” for skill. The strategy is, then, to tinker as much as possible and try to collect as many Black Swan opportunities as you can.”
“Believe me, even those who genuinely claim that they do not believe in recognition, and that they separate labor from the fruits of labor, actually get a serotonin kick from it
I don’t particularly care about the usual. If you want to get an idea of a friend’s temperament, ethics, and personal elegance, you need to look at him under the tests of severe circumstances, not under the regular rosy glow of daily life. Can you assess the danger a criminal poses by examining only what he does on an ordinary day? Can we understand health without considering wild diseases and epidemics? Indeed the normal is often irrelevant.
You need a story to displace a story. Metaphors and stories are far more potent (alas) than ideas; they are also easier to remember and more fun to read. If I have to go after what I call the narrative disciplines, my best tool is a narrative. Ideas come and go, stories stay.
The writer Umberto Eco belongs to that small class of scholars who are encyclopedic, insightful, and nondull. He is the owner of a large personal library (containing thirty thousand books), and separates visitors into two categories: those who react with “Wow! Signore professore dottore Eco, what a library you have! How many of these books have you read?” and the others—a very small minority—who get the point that a private library is not an ego-boosting appendage but a research tool. Read books are far less valuable than unread ones. The library should contain as much of what you do not know as your financial means, mortgage rates, and the currently tight real-estate market allow you to put there. You will accumulate more knowledge and more books as you grow older, and the growing number of unread books on the shelves will look at you menacingly. Indeed, the more you know, the larger the rows of unread books. Let us call this collection of unread books an antilibrary.
History and societies do not crawl. They make jumps. They go from fracture to fracture, with a few vibrations in between. Yet we (and historians) like to believe in the predictable, small incremental progression.
Surprisingly, the book that influenced me was not written by someone in the thinking business but by a journalist: William Shirer’s Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934–1941. Shirer was a radio correspondent, famous for his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. It occurred to me that the Journal offered an unusual perspective. I had already read (or read about) the works of Hegel, Marx, Toynbee, Aron, and Fichte on the philosophy of history and its properties and thought that I had a vague idea of the notions of dialectics, to the extent that there was something to understand in these theories. I did not grasp much, except that history had some logic and that things developed through contradiction (or opposites) in a way that elevated mankind into higher forms of society—that kind of thing. This sounded awfully similar to the theorizing around me about the war in Lebanon. To this day I surprise people who put the ludicrous question to me about what books “shaped my thinking” by telling them that this book taught me (albeit inadvertently) the most about philosophy and theoretical history—and, we will see, about science as well, since I learned the difference between forward and backward processes.
So I stayed in the quant and trading businesses (I’m still there), but organized myself to do minimal but intense (and entertaining) work, focus only on the most technical aspects, never attend business “meetings,” avoid the company of “achievers” and people in suits who don’t read books, and take a sabbatical year for every three on average to fill up gaps in my scientific and philosophical culture. To slowly distill my single idea, I wanted to become a flâneur, a professional meditator, sit in cafés, lounge, unglued to desks and organization structures, sleep as long as I needed, read voraciously, and not owe any explanation to anybody. I wanted to be left alone in order to build, small steps at a time, an entire system of thought based on my Black Swan idea.
“I am a skeptical empiricist and a flâneur-reader, someone committed to getting very deep into an idea”
The Advent of Scalability
- Developers should understand scalability in their system and on their career, but not overly emphasize it. It has it’s drawbacks, it’s consequences and it’s not the right approach to every problem. A scalable profession is good only if you are successful; they are more competitive, produce monstrous inequalities, and are far more random, with huge disparities between efforts and rewards—a few can take a large share of the pie, leaving others out entirely at no fault of their own.
Consider the fate of Giaccomo, an opera singer at the end of the nineteenth century, before sound recording was invented. Say he performs in a small and remote town in central Italy. He is shielded from those big egos at La Scala in Milan and other major opera houses. He feels safe as his vocal cords will always be in demand somewhere in the district. There is no way for him to export his singing, and there is no way for the big guns to export theirs and threaten his local franchise. It is not yet possible for him to store his work, so his presence is needed at every performance, just as a barber is (still) needed today for every haircut. So the total pie is unevenly split, but only mildly so, much like your calorie consumption. It is cut in a few pieces and everyone has a share; the big guns have larger audiences and get more invitations than the small guy, but this is not too worrisome. Inequalities exist, but let us call them mild. There is no scalability yet, no way to double the largest in-person audience without having to sing twice.
Now consider the effect of the first music recording, an invention that introduced a great deal of injustice. Our ability to reproduce and repeat performances allows me to listen on my laptop to hours of background music of the pianist Vladimir Horowitz (now extremely dead) performing Rachmaninoff’s Preludes, instead of to the local Russian émigré musician (still living), who is now reduced to giving piano lessons to generally untalented children for close to minimum wage. Horowitz, though dead, is putting the poor man out of business.
Some people naïvely believe that the process of unfairness started with the gramophone, according to the logic that I just presented. I disagree. I am convinced that the process started much, much earlier, with our DNA, which stores information about our selves and allows us to repeat our performance without our being there by spreading our genes down the generations. Evolution is scalable: the DNA that wins (whether by luck or survival advantage) will reproduce itself, like a bestselling book or a successful record, and become pervasive. Other DNA will vanish. Just consider the difference between us humans (excluding financial economists and businessmen) and other living beings on our planet.
If you live in Mediocristan, you can be comfortable with what you have measured—provided that you know for sure that it comes from Mediocristan. You can also be comfortable with what you have learned from the data. The epistemological consequence is that with Mediocristan-style randomness it is not possible* to have a Black Swan surprise such that a single event can dominate a phenomenon. Primo, the first hundred days should reveal all you need to know about the data. Secondo, even if you do have a surprise, as we saw in the case of the heaviest human, it would not be consequential. If you are dealing with quantities from Extremistan, you will have trouble figuring out the average from any sample since it can depend so much on one single observation. The idea is not more difficult than that. In Extremistan, one unit can easily affect the total in a disproportionate way. In this world, you should always be suspicious of the knowledge you derive from data. This is a very simple test of uncertainty that allows you to distinguish between the two kinds of randomness. Capish?
The überphilosopher Bertrand Russell presents a particularly toxic variant of my surprise jolt in his illustration of what people in his line of business call the Problem of Induction or Problem of Inductive Knowledge (capitalized for its seriousness)—certainly the mother of all problems in life. How can we logically go from specific instances to reach general conclusions? How do we know what we know? How do we know that what we have observed from given objects and events suffices to enable us to figure out their other properties? There are traps built into any kind of knowledge gained from observation.
Both Huet and Bayle were erudites and spent their lives reading. Pierre-Daniel Huet, who lived into his nineties, had a servant follow him with a book to read aloud to him during meals and breaks and thus avoid lost time. He was deemed the most read person in his day.
- The invention of audiobooks!
“I never meant to say that the Conservatives are generally stupid. I meant to say that stupid people are generally Conservative,” John Stuart Mill once complained. This problem is chronic: if you tell people that the key to success is not always skills, they think that you are telling them that it is never skills, always luck. Our inferential machinery, that which we use in daily life, is not made for a complicated environment in which a statement changes markedly when its wording is slightly modified. […] There is an error here, but it is almost inconsequential. Our statistical intuitions have not evolved for a habitat in which these subtleties can make a big difference.
(…) his domain specificity of our inferences and reactions works both ways: some problems we can understand in their applications but not in textbooks; others we are better at capturing in the textbook than in the practical application. People can manage to effortlessly solve a problem in a social situation but struggle when it is presented as an abstract logical problem. We tend to use different mental machinery—so-called modules— in different situations: our brain lacks a central all-purpose computer that starts with logical rules and applies them equally to all possible situations.
Negative Empirism (related to Antil-ibrary, solution to confirmation bias, solution to the Black Swan)
- It’s easy and naturual to us to think and look for evidences that confirms our ideas. Negative Empirism (falseability) is looking for evidences that denies our ideas.
- Developers should look for ways that their system will break, instead of looking for confirmation that it will work. This is important when writing tests, designing resilient / antifragile systems (netflix chaos monkey, aws chaos). And as I’ve said, we can commit a logical mistake in reality but not in the classroom. This asymmetry is best visible in cancer detection. Take doctors examining a patient for signs of cancer; tests are typically done on patients who want to know if they are cured or if there is “recurrence.” (In fact, recurrence is a misnomer; it simply means that the treatment did not kill all the cancerous cells and that these undetected malignant cells have started to multiply out of control.) It is not feasible, in the present state of technology, to examine every single one of the patient’s cells to see if all of them are nonmalignant, so the doctor takes a sample by scanning the body with as much precision as possible. Then she makes an assumption about what she did not see. I was once taken aback when a doctor told me after a routine cancer checkup, “Stop worrying, we have evidence of cure.” “Why?” I asked. “There is evidence of no cancer” was the reply. “How do you know?” I asked. He replied, “The scan is negative.” Yet he went around calling himself doctor! An acronym used in the medical literature is NED, which stands for No Evidence of Disease. There is no such thing as END, Evidence of No Disease. Yet my experience discussing this matter with plenty of doctors, even those who publish papers on their results, is that many slip into the round-trip fallacy during conversation
But it remains the case that you know what is wrong with a lot more confidence than you know what is right.
Popper introduced the mechanism of conjectures and refutations, which works as follows: you formulate a (bold) conjecture and you start looking for the observation that would prove you wrong. This is the alternative to our search for confirmatory instances. If you think the task is easy, you will be disappointed—few humans have a natural ability to do this. I confess that I am not one of them; it does not come naturally to me.
The first experiment I know of concerning this phenomenon was done by the psychologist P. C. Wason. He presented subjects with the three number sequence 2, 4, 6, and asked them to try to guess the rule generating it. Their method of guessing was to produce other three-number sequences, to which the experimenter would respond “yes” or “no” depending on whether the new sequences were consistent with the rule. Once confident with their answers, the subjects would formulate the rule. (Note the similarity of this experiment to the discussion in Chapter 1 of the way history presents itself to us: assuming history is generated according to some logic, we see only the events, never the rules, but need to guess how it works.) The correct rule was “numbers in ascending order,” nothing more. Very few subjects discovered it because in order to do so they had to offer a series in descending order (that the experimenter would say “no” to).Wason noticed that the subjects had a rule in mind, but gave him examples aimed at confirming it instead of trying to supply series that were inconsistent with their hypothesis. Subjects tenaciously kept trying to confirm the rules that they had made up.
Since such gambling is associated with their seeing what they believe to be clear patterns in random numbers, this illustrates the relation between knowledge and randomness. It also shows that some aspects of what we call “knowledge” (and what I call narrative) are an ailment.
A more appropriate solution is to make the event appear more unavoidable. Hey, it was bound to take place and it seems futile to agonize over it. How can you do so? Well, with a narrative. Patients who spend fifteen minutes every day writing an account of their daily troubles feel indeed better about what has befallen them. You feel less guilty for not having avoided certain events; you feel less responsible for it. Things appear as if they were bound to happen. If you work in a randomness-laden profession, as we see, you are likely to suffer burnout effects from that constant second-guessing of your past actions in terms of what played out subsequently. Keeping a diary is the least you can do in these circumstances.
TO BE WRONG WITH INFINITE PRECISION We harbor a crippling dislike for the abstract. One day in December 2003, when Saddam Hussein was captured, Bloomberg News flashed the following headline at 13:01: u.s. treasuries rise; hussein capture may not curb terrorism. Whenever there is a market move, the news media feel obligated to give the “reason.” Half an hour later, they had to issue a new headline. As these U.S. Treasury bonds fell in price (they fluctuate all day long, so there was nothing special about that), Bloomberg News had a new reason for the fall: Saddam’s capture (the same Saddam). At 13:31 they issued the next bulletin: u.s. treasuries fall; hussein capture boosts allure of risky assets. So it was the same capture (the cause) explaining one event and its exact opposite. Clearly, this can’t be; these two facts cannot be linked.
Do media journalists repair to the nurse’s office every morning to get their daily dopamine injection so that they can narrate better? (Note the irony that the word dope, used to designate the illegal drugs athletes take to improve performance, has the same root as dopamine.) It happens all the time: a cause is proposed to make you swallow the news and make matters more concrete. After a candidate’s defeat in an election, you will be supplied with the “cause” of the voters’ disgruntlement. Any conceivable cause can do. The media, however, go to great lengths to make the process “thorough” with their armies of fact-checkers. It is as if they wanted to be wrong with infinite precision (instead of accepting being approximately right, like a fable writer).
As Stalin, who knew something about the business of mortality, supposedly said, “One death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic.” Statistics stay silent in us
Assume that, like Yevgenia, your activities depend on a Black Swan surprise—i.e., you are a reverse turkey. Intellectual, scientific, and artistic activities belong to the province of Extremistan, where there is a severe concentration of success, with a very small number of winners claiming a large share of the pot. This seems to apply to all professional activities I find nondull and “interesting” (I am still looking for a single counter-example, a nondull activity that belongs to Mediocristan).
Acknowledging the role of this concentration of success, and acting accordingly, causes us to be punished twice: we live in a society where the reward mechanism is based on the illusion of the regular; our hormonal reward system also needs tangible and steady results. It too thinks that the world is steady and well behaved—it falls for the confirmation error. The world has changed too fast for our genetic makeup. We are alienated from our environment.
Every morning you leave your cramped apartment in Manhattan’s East Village to go to your laboratory at the Rockefeller University in the East Sixties. You return in the late evening, and people in your social network ask you if you had a good day, just to be polite. At the laboratory, people are more tactful. Of course you did not have a good day; you found nothing. You are not a watch repairman. Your finding nothing is very valuable, since it is part of the process of discovery—hey, you know where not to look. Other researchers, knowing your results, would avoid trying your special experiment, provided a journal is thoughtful enough to consider your “found nothing” as information and publish it. Meanwhile your brother-in-law is a salesman for a Wall Street firm, and keeps getting large commissions—large and steady commissions. “He is doing very well,” you hear, particularly from your father-in-law, with a small pensive nanosecond of silence after the utterance—which makes you realize that he just made a comparison. It was involuntary, but he made one. Holidays can be terrible. You run into your brother-in-law at family reunions and, invariably, detect unmistakable signs of frustration on the part of your wife, who, briefly, fears that she married a loser, before remembering the logic of your profession. But she has to fight her first impulse. Her sister will not stop talking about their renovations, their new wallpaper. Your wife will be a little more silent than usual on the drive home. This sulking will be made slightly worse because the car you are driving is rented, since you cannot afford to garage a car in Manhattan. What should you do? Move to Australia and thereby make family reunions less frequent, or switch brothers-in-laws by marrying someone with a less “successful” brother? Or should you dress like a hippie and become defiant? That may work for an artist, but not so easily for a scientist or a businessman. You are trapped.
You work on a project that does not deliver immediate or steady results; all the while, people around you work on projects that do. You are in trouble. Such is the lot of scientists, artists, and researchers lost in society rather than living in an insulated community or an artist colony.
Believe me, it is tough to deal with the social consequences of the appearance of continuous failure. We are social animals; hell is other people.
My being here is a consequential low-probability occurrence, and I tend to forget it.
My biggest problem with the educational system lies precisely in that it forces students to squeeze explanations out of subject matters and shames them for withholding judgment, for uttering the “I don’t know.” Why did the Cold War end? Why did the Persians lose the battle of Salamis? Why did Hannibal get his behind kicked? Why did Casanova bounce back from hardship? In each of these examples, we are taking a condition, survival, and looking for the explanations, instead of flipping the argument on its head and stating that conditional on such survival, one cannot read that much into the process, and should learn instead to invoke some measure of randomness (randomness, in practice, is what we don’t know; to invoke randomness is to plead ignorance). It is not just your college professor who gives you bad habits. I showed in Chapter 6 how newspapers need to stuff their texts with causal links to make you enjoy the narratives. But have the integrity to deliver your “because” very sparingly; try to limit it to situations where the “because” is derived from experiments, not backward-looking history.
The Platonic blindness I illustrated with the casino story has another manifestation: focusing. To be able to focus is a great virtue if you are a watch repairman, a brain surgeon, or a chess player. But the last thing you need to do when you deal with uncertainty is to “focus” (you should tell uncertainty to focus, not us). This “focus” makes you a sucker; it translates into prediction problems, as we will see in the next section. Prediction, not narration, is the real test of our understanding of the world.
I have said that the Black Swan has three attributes: unpredictability, consequences, and retrospective explainability.
To me utopia is an epistemocracy, a society in which anyone of rank is an epistemocrat, and where epistemocrats manage to be elected. It would be a society governed from the basis of theawareness of ignorance, not knowledge.
the ultimate test of whether you like an author is if you’ve reread him
If you know all possible conditions of a physical system you can, in theory (though not, as we saw, in practice), project its behavior into the future. But this only concerns inanimate objects. We hit a stumbling block when social matters are involved. It is another matter to project a future when humans are involved, if you consider them living beings and endowed with free will. If I can predict all of your actions, under given circumstances, then you may not be as free as you think you are. You are an automaton respond- ing to environmental stimuli. You are a slave of destiny. And the illusion of free will could be reduced to an equation that describes the result of in- teractions among molecules.
However, if you believe in free will you can’t truly believe in social sci- ence and economic projection. You cannot predict how people will act. Except, of course, if there is a trick, and that trick is the cord on which neoclassical economics is suspended. You simply assume that individuals will be rational in the future and thus act predictably. There is a strong link between rationality, predictability, and mathematical tractability. A rational individual will perform a unique set of actions in specified circum- stances. There is one and only one answer to the question of how “ratio- nal” people satisfying their best interests would act. Rational actors must be coherent: they cannot prefer apples to oranges, oranges to pears, then pears to apples. If they did, then it would be difficult to generalize their be- havior. It would also be difficult to project their behavior in time.
Is Bell Curve really a Great Intellectual Fraud?